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Abstract: We use synthetic control methods to study the impact of Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC), introduced in Thailand in 2001, on various macroeconomic outcomes. Thailand is 
compared to a weighted average of control countries in terms of aggregate health financing 
indicators, aggregate health outcomes and economic performance, over the period 1995 to 
2012. Our results suggest that UHC helps alleviate the financial consequences of illnesses. The 
impact of UHC on out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of overall health expenditures is -
13 percentage points and its impact on annual government per capita health spending is US$ 
79. We detect a smaller impact of US$ 60.8 on total health spending per capita which appears 
with a lag. We document positive health impacts as captured by reductions in infant and child 
mortality. We do not find any impact on GDP and the share of the government budget devoted 
to health. Overall, our results complement micro evidence based on within country variation. 
The counterfactual design implemented here may be used to inform other countries on the 
macro level repercussions of UHC. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the impact of universal health coverage (UHC) in Thailand on aggregate 
health financing indicators, GDP per capita and child and infant mortality rates. The focus on 
health financing indicators and child and infant mortality is motivated by the WHO which 
argues that the provision of accessible and qualitatively effective health care for all and 
protection against financial hardship, are core elements of UHC (WHO, 2015). At the same 
time we also examine the effect of introducing UHC on economic performance as it has been 
argued that reduced out-of-pocket expenditure spurs economic growth (Sachs, 2012). While 
there are many micro studies on the effects of UHC in developing countries (Limwattananon et 
al., 2015; Gruber et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2013; Wagstaff and Manachotphong, 2012; 
Barofsky, 2011), including Thailand, there is currently little causal evidence at the aggregate 
level. For policy makers, aggregate level information on the budgetary consequences of 
introducing UHC as well as the potential benefits of such a policy are likely to be important 
inputs in determining whether or not to implement UHC.   
 
The WHO keenly advocates UHC as demonstrated by the 2013 World Health Report on 
universal health coverage. In 2009, only 58 countries were classified as having attained full 
UHC with Thailand being one of them (Stuckler et al., 2010). The country introduced the UHC 
policy, originally known as the 30 baht project, in 2001. Three different schemes are in place, 
including, two employment-based schemes and the tax-financed Universal Coverage Scheme. 
The nationwide roll-out of the Universal Coverage Scheme was completed within a year, 
reaching a coverage of 71%. Coverage increased to 95% in 2003, and 98% by 2011 
(International Health Policy Program, 2011). Health care coverage was extended to 18.5 million 
uninsured people out of a population of 62 million (Townsend et al., 2004). The benefit package 
for the insured includes inpatient and outpatient care at accredited facilities as well as access to 
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prescribed medication.  
 
In the case of Thailand, existing micro evidence documents reductions in out-of-pocket 
payments and improved financial protection due to UHC (for instance, see Limwattananon et 
al., 2015; Gruber et al. 2014). While these papers provide useful evidence on the financial 
impact of the UHC scheme at the household level, for policymakers it is important to know the 
financing implications of introducing UHC and the impact on an entire economy. Capturing 
aggregate effects is not straightforward and the literature is often restricted to papers that rely 
on micro data which may not always support generalization to the aggregate level. Moreno-
Serra and Smith (2015) is a notable exception. They assess the macroeconomic impacts of 
universal health coverage at the global level. The study estimates the effects of health coverage 
for a large panel of 153 countries over the period 1995 to 2008 by means of an instrumental 
variables approach to account for reverse causality. They find that expanding health care 
coverage improves population health as captured by reductions in child and adult mortality. 
Higher government health spending drives the reductions in mortality rates. Courtemanche and 
Zapata (2014) evaluate the impact of universal health coverage on various health indicators 
following a 2006 reform in Massachusetts. Among other empirical strategies, they use synthetic 
control methods. 
 
Establishing a credible counterfactual, that is, identifying what would have happened in case 
UHC had not been introduced, is difficult. In this paper, we use synthetic control methods 
(Abadie et al., 2010) to compare Thailand to a plausible group of control countries without 
UHC. We construct the counterfactual outcome for Thailand as a weighted linear combination 
of control countries. The pool of controls consists of countries without UHC in the Asia and 
Pacific region. The weights are chosen so that the differences between Thailand and the control 
 4 
countries are minimized in terms of pre-treatment average outcomes and other observable 
characteristics. For every outcome variable we construct a separate synthetic Thailand since 
the relative influence of observable and unobservable characteristics is likely to differ across 
outcomes. This approach offers a data-driven way of finding an optimally weighted average of 
control countries so that they track Thailand in terms of outcomes of interest prior to UHC. The 
resulting “synthetic” Thailand is then used to simulate the country’s hypothetical trajectory in 
the absence of UHC. Our goal is to assess whether some of the observed changes in aggregate 
variables in Thailand may be attributed to the implementation of UHC, net of general trends for 
Thailand and its regional neighbors. At the aggregate, we carefully need to check whether the 
control, that is, the synthetic Thailand is a valid counterfactual which displays the outcome 
trajectory Thailand would have had in the absence of the introduction of UHC. The tighter the 
pre-treatment fit between Thailand and the control the more likely it is that we can reproduce 
what would have been observed for Thailand in the absence of UHC. In addition, we compare 
the results from the synthetic control approach with those obtained by employing a difference-
in-difference model since the former is a generalization of the latter (Abadie et al., 2010).   
 
Based on the synthetic control model, where impact is defined as the average difference 
between the post-treatment outcomes for Thailand and the synthetic Thailand, averaged over 
twelve post-treatment years, we find that UHC has -13 percentage point effect on out-of-pocket 
expenditure as a share of total expenditure and the impact on government per capita health 
spending is US$ 79.0. There is a smaller impact of US$60.8 on total per capita health spending 
which appears with a lag. We do not find any impact on the share of the government budget 
share allocated to health. Similarly, there is no evidence that the introduction of UHC has 
harmed the economic performance of Thailand, as measured by GDP, vis-à-vis other countries 
in the region. While we do not have time series data on health seeking behavior, we examined 
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mortality data at the national level. Post-UHC, aggregate infant and child mortality in Thailand 
is approximately 20% lower as compared to the synthetic Thailand. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is divided into three parts. The 
first subsection presents the data sources and defines the outcome indicators. The second 
subsection outlines the two empirical approaches, that is, the synthetic control approach and 
the difference-in-difference model. The last sub-section discusses the composition of the 
control group and compares pre-treatment differences between Thailand and the control 
countries/synthetic control. Section 3 presents the results and related robustness tests. Section 
4 discusses the findings and compares them with evidence based on micro-data. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Methods 
Data sources and definition of outcome indicators 
Our analysis covers the period 1995 to 2012 and relies on data from three sources. We use data 
from the World Health Organization’s Global Health Observatory to assess the impact of 
universal health coverage on several health-spending indicators. To assess the impact of the 
policy on financial protection we use out-of-pocket expenditures as a percentage of total health 
expenditures, which does not include regular insurance payments. Existing evidence indicates 
that high out-of-pocket payments are strongly related with catastrophic health spending and 
impoverishment (Chuma and Maina, 2012; Ghosh, 2011; Yardim et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2007). 
A complementary expenditure category is government expenditure on health as a percentage of 
total health expenditure. To achieve financial protection against catastrophic health spending, 
government spending needs to increase correspondingly. In many developing countries, 
including Thailand, out-of-pocket payments and government health expenditure are the major 
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components of total expenditure on health. The residual category includes private insurance 
programs and contributions to health care financing from charities. We also consider total 
health expenditures per capita and government health expenditure per capita. Finally, we 
consider another core indicator of health financing systems which is government expenditure 
on health as a percentage of the total budget.  
 
Due to the potential link between health expenditure and economic growth, in addition to the 
impact of UHC on health spending we examine its impact on GDP per capita (PPP, constant 
US $2005). Since UHC is not just about financial protection but also the provision of accessible 
care of sufficient quality for all (WHO, 2015), we also study its impact on infant and child 
(under-five) mortality. The data were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (using the “wbopendata” command in STATA) and the UN Inter-Agency Group for 
Child Mortality Estimation, respectively. The mortality data is in part based on simulations and 
estimates have to be interpreted with this caveat in mind. Infant mortality is defined as the 
number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
Child mortality refers to the death of infants and children before reaching the age of five per 
1,000 live births. These mortality estimates are widely used and have already been analyzed in 
panel settings (Moreno-Serra and Smith, 2015) and with the synthetic control method (Pieters 
et al., 2014). All three data sources use the same definitions across countries and the country-
level information has been harmonized by the agencies providing the data in order to support 
international comparisons. 
 
The synthetic control method 
To analyze the impact of UHC on the evolution of annual health spending, the overall 
performance of the economy and child mortality rates, we compare Thailand’s performance 
 7 
with outcome-specific synthetic control groups. These synthetic control groups are composed 
of a weighted average of countries in the Asia and Pacific region without universal health care 
coverage.  
The method is a predominantly data-driven way of determining a counterfactual which allows 
for causal estimates in contexts with only one treated unit and a few control countries (Abadie 
et al., 2010). The method uses numerical optimization to create a weighted average of the 
control countries such that differences in pre-treatment outcomes and observed pre-treatment 
confounders (specified by the researcher) between the treated and synthetic control unit are 
minimized. The method allows the effect of observed and unobserved confounders that may 
affect the outcome to change over time. Subsequently, the computed weights, which are non-
negative and sum to one, are applied to post-treatment outcomes in the control units to simulate 
Thailand’s hypothetical path in the absence of UHC. If a good pre-treatment fit between 
Thailand and its synthetic control is achieved, then differences in post-treatment outcomes may 
plausibly be attributed to the universal health care policy of the country (for additional details 
see Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010; Abadie et al., 2011; Donohue and 
Aneja, 2012; Billmeier and Nanncini, 2013; and Fremeth et al., 2013).   
The approach imposes a linear relationship between the outcomes and the confounders and an 
additive form of the unobserved confounders. Only if the number of pre-treatment periods is 
large relative to the size of the unobserved confounders an approximately unbiased estimator 
of the treatment effect can be obtained since a close match of the pre-treatment outcomes makes 
it more plausible that unobserved confounders are also similar over time between the treated 
and the synthetic control groups. The eligible control countries need to remain unexposed to 
the intervention throughout the period under study. 
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Due to the small sample, classical tests of statistical significance cannot credibly be applied to 
the synthetic control method. However we can gauge significance using pseudo p-values based 
on exact inference or permutation (Fremeth et al, 2013; Rosenbaum 2002a, 2002b). To judge 
the statistical significance of the observed impacts we falsely assign the policy one-by-one to 
all the countries in the pool of control countries. Then, the difference in outcomes between the 
country to which the intervention was falsely attributed, and the synthetic control is calculated 
yielding a placebo treatment effect. This approach allows us to assess whether the treatment 
effect for Thailand is large relative to the estimated placebo effects. In addition to the visual 
inspection, we calculate ratios of post to pre-intervention root mean squared prediction errors 
(RMSPE) for all placebos and Thailand. The RMSPE is the root of the average squared 
difference between the (placebo) treated country and the weighted average of control countries. 
The logic behind the ratio is that a relatively large difference between treatment and control 
after the intervention as compared to before indicates statistical significance. We then rank the 
RMSPEs and calculate pseudo p-values.  
 
The difference-in-difference method 
Since the synthetic control method is a generalization of a conventional difference-in-difference 
method, we compare the estimates obtained from the synthetic control method with those using 
difference-in-difference regressions. In this case, the outcomes in Thailand are compared to a 
set of control countries before and after the intervention. The estimated treatment effect is 
obtained by subtracting the pre-intervention difference from the post-intervention difference. 
Unlike the synthetic control method each control country in the difference-in-difference 
approach has the same weight and it is assumed that the effect of unobserved confounders is 
time-invariant and may be eliminated by differencing the data. The approach also assumes that 
the treatment and control group are equally affected by changes that occur over time implying 
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that in the absence of the intervention the treated and the control countries would have had 
parallel trajectories. As an additional robustness check we use weights generated from the 
synthetic control approach and estimate weighted difference-in-difference models, potentially 
removing remaining pre-treatment differences. 
 
Composition of the control group and descriptive statistics 
A pool of 17 countries in the Asia and Pacific region was used to create the synthetic control 
unit (see Appendix, Table A.T1). These control countries do not have universal health coverage 
and the required macroeconomic data are available for a period of six years before and 12 years 
after the UHC reform in Thailand, that is, 1995 till 2012. 
 
We carefully constructed the pool of control countries in the region and excluded outliers or 
contaminated controls as advised by Abadie et al. (2010). We excluded developed countries 
(Japan and Australia). Two countries leave the sample due to missing data (Myanmar and 
Timor-Leste). We also dropped countries with health financing systems that are (nearly) 
universal or are moving towards universal health coverage (Minh et al., 2014; Asian 
Development Bank, 2011; Somanathan and Hafez, 2010; Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 
2009). These countries are Malaysia, Palau, Sri Lanka, and Tonga. Finally, we excluded the 
special cases of India and China from the analysis, as they are considerably larger in 
geographical size, have populations that are about 18 times larger than Thailand, and generate 
a volume of GDP (in 2005 PPP) that is at least 7.5 times higher.  
For each outcome variable we create a separate synthetic Thailand. This approach is similar to 
other studies that have used synthetic control methods with multiple outcomes (Quast and 
Gonzalez, 2016; Fletcher et al., 2015; Bohn et al., 2014; DeAngelo and Hansen, 2014; Bove 
and Elia, 2014). Since, the synthetic control method permits (i) matching on the pre-treatment 
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outcome variable and (ii) on additional observed pre-treatment confounders specific to every 
outcome as well as (iii) matching one control group for all outcomes, we present two sets of 
estimates. In the first model (main) we match on the pre-treatment outcome variable and a set 
of pre-treatment control variables. We include the following variables: per capita GDP (log), 
total population, share of population under 14 years of age, a subset of the health expenditure 
variables and infant mortality (log). We do not include both infant and child mortality since the 
two indicators are highly correlated. We include total health expenditure per capita, out-of-
pocket expenditure as a share of total health expenditure, and government health expenditure 
as a share of total health expenditure. In the second specification (basic) we match Thailand to 
the set of control countries only on the basis of the pre-treatment outcome variable.  
 
While it is common practice to fit a separate synthetic control for each outcome, as a robustness 
check, we also examined the effect of fitting one synthetic control to all outcomes. We applied 
the synthetic control weights from our main financing outcome (out-of-pocket expenditures), 
as well as the health outcome (infant mortality) to all other outcomes. Finally, we also averaged 
the weights across all outcomes and then calculated impact. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. In terms of magnitude, a simple unweighted comparison 
of pre-treatment means between Thailand and the entire group of control countries indicates 
poor balancing at baseline (compare columns 1 and 2). Out-of-pocket expenditure as a share of 
total health expenditures is 5.6 percentage points higher in Thailand as compared to the control 
countries and government health expenditure as a share of total health expenditure is almost 10 
percentage points lower. Total and government health expenditure per capita are both 
considerably higher in Thailand as compared to the control countries. In contrast, pre-treatment 
means between Thailand and the synthetic control are well balanced across outcomes. Across 
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all outcomes and regardless of the approach used to create the synthetic control (main vs. basic), 
differences in pre-treatment means are close to zero. In other words, the synthetic control for 
every outcome variable resembles the situation in Thailand before the introduction of UHC. 
3. Results 
The impact of UHC using the synthetic control method: Main model 
This section discusses the impacts of UHC, defined as the difference between the post-treatment 
outcomes for Thailand and the synthetic Thailand, averaged over the post-treatment years, on 
various outcomes. Panel A of Table 2 presents these impact estimates based on the main 
synthetic control model. We graph the outcome trajectories of Thailand, the synthetic Thailand 
and a simple average of the control countries in the left-hand column of Figures 1 and 2. In the 
right-hand column of Figures 1 and 2, we present the yearly difference between Thailand and 
its synthetic control (in bold). For a good fit prior to the treatment in 2001, we expect the 
difference line to be tightly aligned around zero. If this is the case then the annual post-treatment 
differences may be interpreted as year-by-year causal impacts. If pre-treatment differences are 
large, we cannot credibly attribute post-treatment differences to UHC. If UHC has an impact 
then after 2001 we expect the post-treatment lines to deviate considerably from zero.  
 
In the right-hand column of Figures 1 and 2 we also plot differences based on placebo models 
where we falsely assign the policy one-by-one to all the other countries in the pool of control 
countries resulting in 17 pseudo-treatments. The differences in outcomes between the synthetic 
control and country to which treatment is falsely attributed are presented in grey. This allows 
us to gauge if differences in post-treatment (treatment effects) Thailand stand out relative to the 
placebo cases.  
 
We start with the results for out-of-pocket expenditures. Before the policy, the indicator tracks 
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its synthetic counterfactual reasonably well (Figure 1, Panel A). The differences between the 
two trajectories (Thailand and synthetic Thailand) are small relative to the differences we 
observe after the introduction of UHC (Figure 1, Panel B). In particular after 1997 the difference 
is concentrated around the zero line. Following UHC, this difference becomes negative and 
increases over the years. The average annual difference, that is the average impact of UHC, is 
-13 percentage points (Table 2, Panel A). Furthermore, the post-intervention difference in the 
trajectory of out-of-pocket expenditures between Thailand and its synthetic counterpart, 
especially after 2006, stands out relative to the placebo models (Figure 1, Panel B). The pseudo 
p-value corresponding to the average effect is 11%. Since the pseudo p-value is based on only 
18 observations (Thailand plus 17 control countries) classical critical values are not applicable. 
The p-values are obtained from the ranking of the RMSPEs. If for example, Thailand is ranked 
first, the chance of this is 1/18 or a p-value of 6%. Moving down just one rank, yields 2/18 or 
a p-value of 11%. UHC has a positive impact on government health spending as a percentage 
of total health expenditure. Over the post-treatment period, the average difference between 
Thailand and its synthetic control is 15.5 percentage points (Table 2, Panel A; Figure 1, Panel 
C) and the pseudo p-value is 17%. Figure A.F1 in the appendix presents the ranking of the 
RMSPEs corresponding to the placebo tests and resulting pseudo p-values. The placebo 
assignment suggests that, in particular after 2003, almost no country in the control group shows 
similar differences with respect to its synthetic control as Thailand over the post-treatment 
period (Figure 1, Panel D). In other words, the annual treatment effect on government health 
expenditure as a share of total health expenditures in Thailand is higher than the placebo 
treatment effects estimates for other countries.  
 
Consistent with the impact on out-of-pocket expenditure, there is a positive impact of UHC on 
per capita government health expenditures. Before treatment, Thailand and its synthetic control 
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follow similar trends (Figure 1, Panel E). The year-by-year differences are close to zero 
indicating good pre-treatment fit (Figure 1, Panel F). The average impact of UHC amounts to 
US$ 79 per year over the post-intervention period with a pseudo p-value of 11% (Table 2, Panel 
A).  As shown  in Panels E and F of Figure 1, over time, the treatment effect grows in magnitude. 
The impact on per capita government health expenditures is larger than the impact on total per 
capita health expenditures. On average, the latter amounts to US$ 60.8 over the post-treatment 
period (Table 2, Panel A; Figure 1, Panel G). The associated pseudo p-value is 11%. The 
difference between Thailand and its synthetic control trajectory is small prior to UHC and is 
larger after the introduction of UHC (Figure 1, Panel H). Moving to the share of the government 
budget allocated to health, the post-treatment average difference is 2.2 percentage points (Table 
2, Panel A). The pseudo p-value is 0.28. The synthetic Thailand does not track Thailand well 
before treatment (Figure 2, Panels A and B). In other words,  there is a poor pre-treatment fit 
and given the set of control countries and the limited amount of pre-intervention data we are 
unable to establish a good counterfactual.  
 
We next consider the impact of UHC on GDP per capita. Panels C and D of Figure 2 suggest 
that Thailand does not track its synthetic counterfactual well before the introduction of UHC. 
Several placebo models show a much tighter pre-treatment fit as indicated by smaller 
differences between treatment and control. After UHC, we see positive differences 
materializing in Thailand relative to its synthetic control. The average treatment effect has a 
pseudo p-value of 0.28 indicating that in terms of RMSPE, Thailand ranks 5th out of 18 
countries. Given the data at hand we are unable to establish a good counterfactual. As shown 
in Panel A, Table A.T1, all the weight is given to a single country. Nevertheless, the results do 
suggest that UHC has not had a negative effect on GDP per capita. 
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Turning to the effect of UHC on health outcomes, we see in Panel E of Figure 2 that there is a 
steady decline in infant and child mortality over the study period. The impacts of UHC on infant 
and child mortality are -19 and -21%, respectively (Figure 2, Panels E and G; Table 2, Panel 
A). The pre-treatment difference is small relative to the post-treatment difference. The 
corresponding pseudo p-values are 11% (Figure 2, Panels F and H). 
 
Robustness check - assessing the impact of UHC using a basic synthetic control model 
Our main model specification does not make full use of all control countries. Only a handful of 
countries receive non-zero weights in constructing the synthetic control (Panel A, Table A.T1 
in the Appendix). While the model leads to considerable improvement in balance across 
baseline characteristics compared to the unweighted averages, differences between Thailand 
and the synthetic Thailand remain (Table A.T2). Since we only have 17 control countries 
balancing on many dimensions is not always feasible. Therefore, we also estimate a basic model 
where we only match on the pre-treatment trend of the outcome variable. Results are presented 
in Panel B of Table 2 and Figures are provided in the Appendix (A.F2, A.F3 and A.F4).  With 
the exception of the GDP per capita model, all available control countries are now assigned a 
non-zero weight in the basic model and the weights are well distributed with no single country 
dominating (Panel B, Table A.T1). Moreover, the pre-treatment difference in the outcome 
variables is closer to zero than in the main model for all eight outcomes under study (Table 
A.T2). 
 
Results are reasonably stable across models. The basic model shows that the difference between 
observed and counterfactual post-treatment outcomes in out-of-pocket spending is negative 
following the introduction of UHC (Figure A.F2, Panel A). The impact is -15.5 percentage 
points with a pseudo p-value of 11% (Table 2, Panel B) compared to -13.0 (p-value=0.11) in 
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the main model while the impact on government health expenditures as share of total health 
expenditures is 17.7 percentage points with a pseudo p-value of 11% as compared to 15.5 (p-
value=0.17) in the main model. The results also show that UHC has a positive impact on per 
capita government health expenditures. However, the estimated average difference between 
Thailand and its synthetic control is less pronounced as compared to the main model (see 
column 3 in Table 2). With regard to total per capita health expenditures, we document a much 
smaller effect and a higher p-value (Table 2, Panel B). Consistent with the main model, we find 
that the introduction of UHC does not have an impact on the government budget allocated to 
health nor on GDP per capita and the impact of UHC on infant and child mortality remains at 
about -20%. However at least the former model suffers from relatively poor pre-treatment fits 
and we do not want to over-interpret impact estimates and associated p-values.  
 
Robustness check - assessing the impact of UHC using one synthetic control for all outcomes 
While it is common practice to fit a separate synthetic control for each outcome, we also 
examined the effect of fitting one synthetic control to all outcomes. To this end, and in order to 
cover both the financial and health outcomes, we use the weights from our main financing 
variable (out-of-pocket expenditures; Table A.T1, Panel A, Column 1) as well as one health 
indicator (infant mortality; Table A.T1, Panel A, Column 7). The results are presented in the 
appendix in Table A.T3 and Figure A.F5. Figure A.F5 shows that the pretreatment fit is 
considerably weaker when matching is not done relative to the outcome under study. We obtain 
a reasonably close fit for government health expenditures (as share of total health expenditures) 
with weights from out-of-pocket expenditures, which is attributable to the high (negative) 
correlation among these variables. A similarly good fit is obtained for child mortality using 
infant mortality weights. However, the fit between the child health outcomes using weights 
from out-of-pocket health expenditures, and vice versa, is poor. With these caveats in mind, 
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except for one outcome, the impact estimates are qualitatively in line with the findings from the 
main model (compare Table 2, Panel A with Panel B and C of Table A.T3). When we use the 
out-of-pocket weights we tend to overestimate the impact of UHC on the health financing 
variables while the use of the infant mortality weights leads to smaller impact estimates for the 
health financing outcomes. Finally, we also calculated impacts by applying the average weights 
from the main model across all outcomes (row average of Table A.T1, Panel A, Columns 1-8). 
These impact estimates are qualitatively similar to those obtained using the main model, 
although they tend to be smaller for the health financing outcomes and larger for the mortality 
related outcomes (Table A.T3, Panel D). 
 
While we have provided estimates based on one synthetic control across all outcomes, the 
patterns in Figure A.F5 suggest that the pre-treatment trend and underlying data generating 
processes vary across outcomes and that the optimal weights for financing and health variables 
need to be different to ensure better pre-treatment balance. We are also limited by the small set 
of control countries while having to balance on several outcome variables and covariates. A 
larger pool may have yielded more stable weights across outcomes.  
 
Robustness checks using a difference-in-difference model 
We also estimated the average impact of UHC on all outcomes using difference-in-difference 
models (Table 3). Since the standard errors of the models presented in this table are based on 
one treatment country and 17 control countries (Panel A) and on one treatment country, and 
for some outcomes, a smaller set of control countries (Panels B and C), standard errors have 
to be interpreted with caution.  
 
In the difference-in-difference models we include country and year-specific effects, the total 
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population and the share of the population under 14 years of age. Estimates in Table 3, Panel 
A are based on a regression model giving equal weights to all the countries in the sample. The 
impacts of UHC are -15.8 percentage points and 18.2 percentage points on out-of-pocket 
expenditure and on government health expenditures as a percent of total health expenditures, 
respectively. The impact on per capita government health expenditure is US$ 56.2, while there 
is a more modest impact of US $32.3 on total per capita health expenditure. These effects, 
especially for out-of-pocket expenditure and government health expenditure as a share of total 
health expenditures locate in the same range as those based on the synthetic control models. 
Similar to the estimates based on the synthetic control approach, there is no significant impact 
on government health expenditure as a share of total government spending or on GDP per 
capita. The statistically significant treatment effects on infant and child mortality are -15 and -
13 percentage points, respectively.  
 
In Panel B of Table 3 we present difference-in-difference estimates based on applying the 
country weights obtained from the synthetic control main model approach. Panel C of the same 
table provides estimates based on the weights from the synthetic control basic model. The 
motivation of these “hybrid” models is that after weighting, the difference-in-difference 
approach can potentially remove remaining pre-treatment differences. Depending on the 
weights used, the average treatment effects associated with UHC are -9 or -15 percentage points 
in the case of out-of-pocket expenditures, as well as 12.8 or 17.6 percentage points in the case 
of government expenditures as a percent of total health expenditures. The impact on 
government health expenditure per capita ranges between US$ 52.1 and US$ 68.5. Consistent 
with estimates based on the synthetic control methods, increases in total health expenditures 
are smaller and there is no effect on the share of the government budget spent on health. 
However, unlike estimates based on the synthetic control method, the effects on infant and child 
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mortality are considerably smaller and statistically insignificant. 
 
4. Discussion 
Regardless of whether we rely on the main or the basic specification of the synthetic control 
approach, we interpret the estimates in that the introduction of UHC in Thailand has resulted in 
increased financial protection by shifting the burden of costs from individuals to the state. This 
shift seems to have occurred without an impact on the share of the public budget spent on health 
care. Whether these are causal effects depends on the extent to which the assumptions of the 
synthetic control approach are satisfied. While this paper provides new causal evidence at the 
macro level, the analysis suffers from three main limitations: First, the creation of the synthetic 
control unit was based on only six years of pre-intervention information since data prior to 1995 
was unavailable. Second, we only have a set of 17 control countries from the region. At the 
same time, we needed to balance pre-treatment characteristics along several dimensions. As a 
result some pre-treatment co-variates such as GDP and population size are not always well-
balanced (Table A.T2). Although, in most instances, the differences based on the synthetic 
control approach tend to be smaller than the unweighted  difference. Moreover, Figures 1 and 
2 show that there are differences in the quality of the match across the various pre-treatment 
outcomes. Clearly, the match for government health expenditure as a share of the total 
government budget is not as tight as for total per capita health expenditures. Third, while we 
find consistent impacts of UHC on the mortality variables, in part, the mortality data are 
simulated and exhibit stable downward trends over the pre- and post-treatment period which 
raises doubts about a UHC induced impact.  
 
As a robustness check we also examined the effect of UHC using a difference-in-difference 
approach which relies on different assumptions to identify a causal effect. The size and 
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significance of the estimates were qualitatively similar to those based on the synthetic control 
approach. In sum and despite the above mentioned limitations, there is evidence that UHC in 
Thailand has enhanced financial protection. 
 
A pertinent question arising from the estimates of UHC on the various health expenditure 
outcomes is whether they reveal any evidence of efficiency gains which may be attributed to 
the scheme. The estimates indicate that out-of-pocket expenditures and government health 
expenditures as a share of total health expenditures are close substitutes. At the same time we 
find that the impact on government health expenditure per capita is larger  than the impact on 
total health expenditure per capita, indicating lower per capita private expenditures on health. 
For instance, based on the estimates reported in Table 2, Panel A, we find that, on average, the 
annual impact of UHC on public health expenditure per capita is US$ 79.0 while the impact on 
private health expenditure per capita is US$ -18, on average, per year. Based on this it would 
seem that the reform does not increase efficiencies in the procurement of health care services, 
but shifts expenditures from households to the government. At the same time we find a modest 
(1.32 to 2.16 percentage points) impact on average annual government health expenditures as 
a share of total government spending (which may in part be attributed to poor model fit). While 
we cannot directly assess whether there have been efficiency gains, our estimates suggest that 
a relatively small increase in the share of the budget allocated to health care expenditure may 
have been sufficient to reach UHC. More finely grained hospital and pricing data would be 
necessary to estimate possible efficiency gains. 
 
In terms of health outcomes UHC has a negative effect on both infant and child mortality. While 
this is an appealing result, as pointed out earlier, the mortality data is in part based on 
simulations. Hence, trends and changes in trends have to be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
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Furthermore, the negative effect on out-of-pocket expenditure and the lagged effect on total 
health expenditure does raise skepticism about a UHC-driven decline in mortality. However, 
theoretically this is possible. For instance, due to lower out-of-pocket expenditures, households 
may be more likely to have money available to spend on other consumption goods and services, 
some of which may benefit children (e.g. nutrition, time spent rearing children). Improvements 
in infant mortality could also be driven by the most vulnerable children, i.e. those born to low 
socio-economic status households. While prior to UHC infant mortality was higher in poorer 
provinces, this gap closes after the introduction of UHC suggesting that at the aggregate infant 
mortality was reduced by 2 per 1,000 births (Gruber at al., 2014). Regardless of this and other 
possibilities, we do not want to overstate the effect of UHC on the mortality outcomes.  
 
In this respect, it would have been interesting to investigate the impact of UHC on a set of 
additional indicators such as health care utilization to capture demand for health services, 
government expenditure on education or other heads to expenditure in order to examine 
budgetary shifts, and on overall budget deficits to gauge fiscal sustainability. However, we were 
unable to find systematic and consistent time-series information for these indicators. Even the 
most comprehensive data sources such as the World Bank’s World Development Indicators do 
not coherently report the required information. 
 
Finally, our results may be compared with existing micro evidence. Based on household data, 
Limwattananon et al. (2015) show that the Thai UHC reform reduced out-of-pocket 
expenditures by 28%. Similar evidence is reported for Mexico (Barofsky, 2011). With regard 
to health outcomes and health seeking behavior, previous micro studies have also reported 
positive impacts. For instance, the Thai UHC positively affects working age people by reducing 
the likelihood that they report themselves to be too sick to work (Wagstaff and Manachotphong, 
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2012), it further increases the demand for outpatient services (Panpiemras et al., 2011), and 
preventive check-ups (Ghislandi et al., 2013). At the same time, there is no evidence that ex 
ante moral hazard is affected (Ghislandi et al., 2013). In addition, Gruber et al. (2014) show 
that infant mortality rates fell due to better access to health services among poor Thai. Clearly, 
our findings of a negative effect on out-of-pocket expenditure and infant mortality are similar 
to those based on these micro-studies. In addition, we provide new evidence on the impact of 
UHC on central government finances, aggregate health spending as well as on GDP. 
 
5. Conclusion 
By providing macroeconomic evidence on the impact of UHC this paper complements the 
existing microeconomic evidence on universal health coverage in the case of Thailand. While 
not beyond reproach, mainly due to data limitations, the synthetic control approach adopted in 
this paper showed that the UHC policy has led to a negative effect on out-of-pocket 
expenditures and a corresponding positive effect on government expenditure on health. Positive 
impacts on the share of the government budget allocated to health were modest and statistically 
insignificant. We were also unable to detect a statistically significant impact of UHC on GDP. 
We did find that UHC was associated with negative effects on infant and child mortality 
although data limitations preclude us from overstating this claim.  
 
Evidence on the aggregate effects of UHC, especially on government finances is important from 
a policy perspective as low-income countries strive to introduce policies to reach UHC. This 
study is the first to provide causal evidence on the impact of UHC on government finances. A 
causal investigation of government finances is important as many low-income countries lack 
resources to guarantee universal coverage. In implementing UHC, policy makers have to jointly 
address three related objectives, namely (i) equity in access to health services, (ii) the quality 
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of health services and (iii) financial-risk protection (WHO, 2015). However, these objectives 
can only be achieved if a country has a sound health financing system in place (WHO, 2010). 
The approach presented should be viewed as a complement to micro approaches and an 
arguably credible way of carrying out rigorous macroeconomic assessments of policies such as 
UHC. 
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Figure 1: Impact and placebo tests of universal health care coverage in Thailand for 
aggregate health expenditure variables (main model)  
Panel A: Out-of-pocket expenditures 
as % of total health expenditures 
 
Panel B: Placebo Out-of-pocket 
as % of total health expenditures 
 
 
Panel C: Government health expenditures  
as % of total health expenditures 
Panel D: Placebo: Government health expenditures  
as % of total health expenditures 
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Panel E: Government health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
Panel F: Placebo Government health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
 
Panel G: Total health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
 
Panel H: Placebo Total health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $)  
 
Note: The impact on Thailand is indicated in bold.  
Figure 2: Impact and placebo tests of universal health care coverage in Thailand for 
aggregate health expenditure, economic and child mortality variables (main model)  
Panel A: Government health expenditures as % of total 
government spending  
 
Panel B: Placebo Government health expenditures as % of 
total government spending 
 
Panel C: Log GDP per capita  
(constant $) 
Panel D: Placebo Log GDP per capita  
(constant $) 
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Panel E: Log infant mortality (per 1,000) 
 
Panel F: Placebo Log infant mortality (per 1,000) 
 
Panel G: Log child mortality (per 1,000) 
 
Panel H: Placebo Log child mortality (per 1,000)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The impact on Thailand is indicated in bold. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Pre-treatment balance of outcomes  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Synthetic 
Control 
Pre-treatment mean of outcomes: Thailand Controls Main Model 
Basic 
Model 
Out-of-pocket as % of total health expenditures 37.60 31.96 37.55 37.61 
Government health expend.as % of total health expenditures 52.35 61.89 52.77 52.36 
Government health expenditures per capita (PPP $)  91.77 77.91 99.85 91.74 
Total health expenditures per capita (PPP $)  175.57 103.26 174.54 175.54 
Government health expenditures as % of total government spending 10.17 9.67 9.72 10.16 
Log GDP per capita (constant $) 8.16 6.87 8.05 8.08 
Log infant mortality (per 1,000)  3.06 3.78 3.07 3.06 
Log child mortality (per 1,000)  3.23 4.04 3.24 3.24 
Note: The pre-treatment outcomes are averaged over the six-year period (1995-2000) prior to the introduction of UHC. Averages are presented for Thailand, for the set of 17 
control countries, and the synthetic “Thailands” used in the analysis. A separate synthetic Thailand is estimated for each outcome.  
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Table 2: The impact of universal health care coverage in Thailand using synthetic control methods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Out-of-
pocket as % 
of total 
health 
expend.  
Gov't health 
expend. as 
% of total 
health 
expend. 
Gov't 
health 
expend. 
per 
capita 
(PPP $)  
Total 
health 
expend. 
per capita 
(PPP $)  
Gov't 
health 
expend. 
as % of 
total gov't 
spend.  
Log GDP 
per capita 
(constant 
$) 
Log 
infant 
mortal
ity 
(per 
1,000)  
Log 
child 
mortality 
(per 
1,000)  
Panel A: Main model (Matching on pre-treatment dependent variable, other outcomes, and demographic controls) 
Impact -12.98 15.54 78.98 60.83 2.16 0.25 -0.19 -0.21 
Pseudo p-value  0.11 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.28 0.28 0.11 0.11 
Panel B: Basic Model (Matching on pre-treatment dependent variable) 
Impact -15.47 17.70 53.65 28.20 1.32 0.22 -0.21 -0.23 
Pseudo p-value 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.11 0.11 
Note: Impact is defined as the average difference between the post-treatment outcomes for Thailand and the synthetic “Thailands”, averaged over twelve post-treatment years. 
A separate synthetic Thailand is estimated for every outcome.  
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Table 3: The impact of universal health care coverage in Thailand using panel regressions 
  
Out-of-
pocket 
as % of 
total 
health 
expend.  
Gov't 
health 
expend. 
as % of 
total 
health 
expend. 
Gov't 
health 
expend. 
per 
capita 
(PPP $)  
Total 
health 
expend. 
per 
capita 
(PPP $)  
Gov't 
health 
expend. 
as % of 
total 
gov't 
spend.  
Log GDP 
per 
capita 
(constant 
$) 
Log 
infant 
mortality 
(per 
1,000)  
Log child 
mortality 
(per 
1,000)  
Panel A: Country and time fixed effects plus demographic covariates (unweighted)   
Impact -15.79* 18.17* 56.24* 32.29* 1.49  0.05 -0.15* -0.13* 
 (1.28) (1.46) (14.91) (14.66) (0.93)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  
N 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 
Panel B: Country and time fixed effects plus demographic covariates (using synthetic control weights corresponding to 
main model Panel A of Table 2) 
Impact -9.04* 12.75 68.46* 48.45 1.26  -0.09* -0.15+ -0.15  
 (2.25) (6.97) (20.22) (26.77) (1.04)  (0.00) (0.04) (0.05)  
Nr. of control countries 4 3 3 4 4 1 2 2 
N 90 72 72 90 90 36 54 54 
Panel C: Country and time fixed effects plus demographic covariates (using synthetic control weights corresponding to 
basic model Panel B of Table 2) 
Impact -14.96* 17.59* 52.13* 31.54 1.41  0.13* -0.07 -0.06  
 (1.58) (1.71) (15.97) (18.67) (0.91)  (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)  
Nr. of control countries 17 17 17 17 17 2 17 17 
N 324 324 324 324 324 54 324 324 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the country level, * p-value 0.05, + p-value 0.10.  
